Abstract. To date, researches on agent multi-issue negotiation are mostly based on linear utility functions. However, the relationship between utilities and resources is usually saturated nonlinear. To this end, we expand linear utility functions to nonlinear cases according to the law of diminishing marginal utility. Furthermore, we propose a negotiation model on multiple divisible resources with two phases to realize Pareto optimal results. The computational complexity of the proposed algorithm is polynomial order. Experimental results show that the optimized efficiency of the proposed algorithm is distinctly higher than prior work.
Introduction
Allocation of multiple divisible resources under incomplete information is always an interesting problem where negotiation is one of essential approaches, such as the work of Luo et al [1] , Saha et al [2] , Chevaleyre et al [3] , Fatima et al [5] . They proposed Pareto optimal negotiation, envy-free negotiation, and welfare optimal negotiation in their researches. In our past work [6] [7] [8] , we also studied some problems of multi-issue negotiation.
However, prior researches mostly did not take explicit utility functions, or directly regarded resources as agents' utilities. Therefore, only linear utility functions were considered. However, there are much cases where utility functions are nonlinear. For example, $100 will produce lots of utilities if an agent has not a bean, while $100 will produce few utilities if that agent has a capital of a hundred million dollars. The utilities of autonomous agents are some kinds of subjective belief, and resources are objective things, i.e. resources generally have firing effect on utilities.
So the relationship between utilities and resources is usually saturated nonlinear just as indicated by Wooldridge [9] . Furthermore, the relationship should follow the law of diminishing marginal utility according to microeconomics, i.e. the increments of utilities decrease along with the increments of resources. Recently, some researches gradually paid more attention to nonlinear utility functions such as [11, 12, [21] [22] [23] [24] .
We try to expand linear utility functions to nonlinear cases in this paper. This work is motivated by the sigmoid function of artificial neuron of artificial neural network. In particular, we propose an improved nonlinear utility function to describe the relationship between utilities and resources. The proposed function not only follows the law of diminishing marginal utility, but also is consistent with the assumption of Wooldridge et al.
Sequentially, we bring forward a negotiation model on multiple divisible resources. In particular, we firstly take resources as indivisible units and reach a preliminary agreement using strict alternation in the first phase. Information about the preferences and firing rate of the opponent is also obtained at the same time. Subsequently, we divide resources using a greedy algorithm in the second phase and realize Pareto optimal results.
The first contribution of this paper is the proposal of a new utility function which follows the law of diminishing marginal utility while it is mostly ignored by previous work. Moreover, in the first phase of negotiation, strict alternation provides not only a preliminary agreement but also some useful information for agents. Therefore, history information is not necessarily required. Secondly, this model can generate Pareto optimal results for all negotiation agents. The computational complexity of the proposed algorithm is polynomial order and it is usually lower than that of Fatima et al. Experimental results show that the optimized efficiency of the proposed algorithm has an advantage over the work of Fatima et al. The application of this work includes many similar domains such as allocation of band width, allocation of computational resources, and allocation of business etc.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic notions about negotiation scenes and utility functions. We propose a negotiation model and a feasible optimal algorithm in section 3. Section 4 discusses negotiation with complete information, and section 5 discusses negotiation under incomplete information. Experimental settings and results are provided in section 6. Background and related work is provided in section 7. Conclusions are drawn in the last section.
Basic Notions
In this section, we describe some basic notions about negotiation such as negotiation scenes, information states of agents, a nonlinear utility function, marginal utility function, and the ratio of marginal utility function. We also present some useful properties of the proposed nonlinear utility function.
Negotiation Scenes
We improve the negotiation scenes of Fatima et al [5] where agent a and b negotiate over m (m ≥ 2) divisible resources (issues). We assume that the m resources are independent each other. We let agent a firstly make a bid for instance, and agent b is taken as the opponent.
Definition 1. Negotiation scenes
where, N denotes a negotiation scene. a, b denote agents who are participating the negotiation. R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m } denotes divisible resources to be allocated. they also can be regarded as issues of negotiation. m denotes the number of resources to be allocated. n denotes the deadline of negotiation, namely the maximum turn of negotiation is n. ρ = {ρ 1 , ρ 2 , . . . , ρ m } denotes discount factors of resources (0 ≤ ρ i ≤ 1). t ∈ N denotes the current turn of negotiation. N denotes natural number.
Definition 2. Information state of agents
Where, I a is the information state of agent a. k a = {k
. . , k m a } denotes resources/issues preferences of agent a. In which, k i a denotes the preference of agent a for r i . We assume that k
In this paper, we assume that the preference of agent is invariable along with the quantity of resources allocated. It is a fixed factor for the agent initially. x a = {x 
A Nonlinear Utility Function
There are various researches on nonlinear utility functions of negotiation recently. Some of researches focused on general nonlinear utility function and did not give practical nonlinear utility function, some of researches took Bell function such as [12] . Most of researches did not provide any rules to select nonlinear utility functions synthetically. To this end, we present these rules illustrated as follows.
Most models in economics and finances assume a non-decreasing utility function with diminishing marginal utility. While Arrow-Pratt's definition of absolute risk aversion is related to concave utility functions which implies decreasing marginal utility. Due to the above five rules of utility function, we are motivated by the sigmoid function of artificial neuron. The relationship between utilities and resources(money) indicated by Woodridge is absolutely suitable for sigmoid function. So we propose an improved nonlinear utility function through revising sigmoid function illustrated in Fig. 1 .
Definition 3. An improved nonlinear utility function
where, u i a denotes the nonlinear utility of agent a for resource r i . λ a ∈ (0, inf) denotes the firing rate of resources to the utilities of agent a. It shows the impact factor of resource to utility. For simplicity, we assume that λ a is same to all resources of agent a.
The more λ a is, the faster u i a increases. Especially, u i a is a step function when λ a → inf. The utility of agent a can not obtain k i a even if all of r i are allocated to it when λ a < 4 because agent a can not be satisfied by the existing resource.
The proposed utility function is different from the prior functions. In particular, when λ a ≤ 1, the utility function is just approximately linear. Therefor, the prior work of Fatima et al is a particular one of our nonlinear utility function when λ is small. So our proposed utility function is more general and common, including linear and nonlinear cases concurrently.
Definition 4. The total utilities of agents
U a denotes the total utilities of agent a for all resources. t denotes the current turn of negotiation. u i a denotes the utilities of agent a for resource r i which is defined in definition 3.
Definition 5. Marginal utility function of agents in nonlinear domain
It is shown that the marginal utility in nonlinear domain is related to not only the preferences of agents, i.e. k i a , but also the firing rate of resources to the utilities of agent a, i.e. λ a , as well as the quantity of resources allocated to agent a, i.e. x 
where, θ i denotes the ratio of the marginal utility function of agent b to that of agent a.
If we use a greedy algorithm to generate counter-offer, agent a wishes to maximize its own utilities after satisfying the requirement of agent b's utilities. It divides the m pies such that it reserves the maximum possible shares for those resources where θ i is low, and gives to agent b the maximum possible shares for those resources where θ i is high. Thus, agent a would begin by giving agent b the maximum possible shares for the resource with the highest θ i . It then does the same for the resource with the next highest θ i and repeat this process until utility requirement of agent b is satisfied. Therefore, the remainders of resources are allocated to agent a to maximize agent a's utilities. In this way, not only the requirement of agent b's utilities is quickly realized, but also the maximum utilities of agent a is obtained. 
According to greedy algorithm, agent a should always choose the highest θ i at point x 
We can find that the work of Fatima where
is adopted is just the rank of θ i of linear utility function.
Properties of the Proposed Nonlinear Utility Function
The proposed utility function follows the following properties which are important for micro-economics. The utility function is bounded, is a concave function, follows the law of diminishing marginal utility, and displays increasing absolute risk aversion according to Arrow-Pratt [10] .
a is a concave function. End. Property 4. u i a displays increasing absolute risk aversion. Proof: The Arrow-Pratt measure is an attribute of a utility function. If we denote a utility function by u(x). The Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion is defined by:
. We know that γ(x i a ) also increases when x i a increases. It means that the risk aversion of agent a increases when x i a increases. Therefore, u i a displays increasing absolute risk aversion. Therefore, when agent a possesses lots of this resource, he prefers to reject rather than accept it. End.
Negotiation Model
In this section, we first discuss the proposed greedy algorithm for generating optimal proposals. Sequentially, we discuss the conditions of acceptance for offers.
Generating Optimal Proposals
Fatima et al [5] used a greedy algorithm to realize a Pareto optimal result. Just like knapsack problem, the greedy algorithm ranks k
However, the utility function in this paper is nonlinear so that it may be difficult to choose resources.
We propose an improved greedy algorithm to obtain Pareto optimal solutions with nonlinear utility functions.
where, U I b denotes the sum of agent b's utilities that must be satisfied when agent a uses a greedy algorithm. The proposed approach draws horizontal line in Fig. 3 from the top to the bottom. It means that the value of θ i decreases from the biggest one until agent b is satisfied. The value of abscissa of the point of intersection with the line of θ i is x i a , and (1 − x i a ) of the resource is allocated to agent b. Agent a occupies all the remainders of this resource, as long as agent b is satisfied. According to the greedy algorithm, agent a can obtain its Pareto optimal results.
The process of optimization is illustrated in algorithm 1, in which, ω is the amount of pieces of each resource divided by two agents, χ is the initial value of θ i , ι is the step size of θ i decreasing, u 
for i = 1 : m //m resources 4.
j := ω + 1 //each resource is divided into ω pieces 5.
while
end for 10.
χ := χ − ι 11.
end while 12.
U Proof: Agent b will obtain all of resources in the worst case. Thus the inner nesting of 'While' cycle should be done ω times, 'For' cycle should be done m times, and the outer 'While' cycle should be done η times. Therefore, the computational complexity of algorithm 1 is O(ωmη). End.
Property 5. The computational complexity of algorithm 1 is usually lower than that of Fatima et al.
Proof: The computational complexity of the work of Fatima et al is O(mπl 3 t(h− t/2)), where t = min(2l − 1, h), h is the maximum turn of negotiation. Thus it is O(mπl
The computational complexity of algorithm 1 is O(ωmη). If we control the size of ω and η, the computational complexity of algorithm 1 is usually lower than that of Fatima et al. End.
Conditions of Acceptance for Offers
There are two conditions of acceptance for offers. One is that the utility of the current offer that the offering agent received is not smaller than that of the next his own counter-offer. Another is that the offering agent can not optimize the utility of own without decreasing the utility of the opponent, i.e. the current offer is a Pareto optimal offer. 
Negotiation with Complete Information
We assume that agent a and b know each other and the public information such as R, m, n, ρ is known by the two agents. We take the package deal procedure for this negotiation, then we can derive from the work of Fatima et al [5] that an agreement takes place at t = 1 for the package deal procedure, and the time taken to determine an equilibrium offer for t = 1 is O(mn), where m is the number of resources and n is the deadline. We also know that the package deal procedure generates a Pareto optimal outcome.
We discuss the process of negotiation with complete information as follows. If negotiation reaches the deadline, then the agent whose turn it is takes everything and leaves nothing for its opponent. We then consider the preceding time periods (t < n), the offering agent will propose a counter-offer using greedy algorithm. Due to the complete information, each agent should consider the possibility of acceptance of the opponent. Furthermore, because of the discount of resources, each agent will not waste any time in order to avoid the loss of utility. Everyone knows that any more turn of negotiation means a loss of utility for both agents. So an agreement takes place at t = 1 for the package deal procedure.
So if agent b is the offering agent at t = n turn, then agent b will take everything and leave nothing for agent a. It means that the utilities of agent b is ρ 
If agent a is the offering agent at t = n turn, then we can use a similar way to generate optimal offer at t = 1 turn.
At t = 2 turn, agent b will take everything, then the utility of agent b is 
Negotiation under Incomplete Information
We propose a negotiation model with two phases. There are two aims in the first phase. We use the strict alteration [2] where resources are taken as indivisible units and two agents alter to choose one resource to reach a preliminary agreement. At the same time, we can obtain some useful information about the opponent's preferences reasoned by two rules derived from the strict alteration. Sequentially, we take resources as divisible units and make tradeoff between two agents to get a Pareto optimal result in the second phase.
The First Phase
We cite the approach of strict alteration [2] in the first phase. Each agent will always choose the resource with the biggest preference in the remainder resources.
First phase:
Step 1: A random device chooses one of the two agents and marks this agent as s. Denote the set of resources yet to be negotiated by G. Initially, G = R.
Step 2: Now, s will choose one of the remaining resources r ∈ G, r is allocated to s.
Step 3: Mark the other agent as s and update G to G−{r}. If |G| >= 1 return to Step 2, otherwise stop.
If agent a is the first agent to choose resources and m is assumed to be even, then the following sequences are obtained. We can obtain a preliminary agreement in the first phase. Two agents allocate all resources where each resource is regarded as indivisible one. At the same time, this agreement is the base of the second phase where a greedy algorithm runs.
Through analyzing the above two sequences, agent a can obtain some useful information of agent b. Particularly, two rules of preferences of agent b can be obtained.
Agent a and b rank the resources with the preference. The resource with biggest preference of agent a is denoted by r Example 3. For example, we assume that agent a and b alter to choose 6 resources {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 , r 5 , r 6 }. We assume the following 4 cases illustrated in table 3. Furthermore, the results of choices of agent a and b are illustrated in table 4. Case 1 r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r6 r5 r4 r3 r2 r1 Case 2 r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 Case 3 r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r2 r1 r3 r4 r5 r6 Case 4 r1 r2 r3 r6 r5 r4 r1 r3 r5 r4 r2 r6 satisfies the fact r 4 is ranked as the first order. Therefore agent b must be C 1 class. Agent b obtains all of r 4 &r 2 in the first phase of negotiation trough the approach of strict alternation.
Based on the above rules, we can obtain some useful information which will help us in the next phase. If there is only one possible class, then agent b must Table 6 . Strict be it; Otherwise, we can take advantage of probability of opponents to select the type with the maximal probability. So not only preliminary agreement but also preferences and firing rate of opponents can be obtained in the first phase.
The Second Phase
After phase 1, we can obtain a preliminary agreement and some useful information. Sequentially, we enter the second phase to obtain a Pareto optimal result. Based on the agreement of phase 1, if agent b's utility requirement is satisfied, then agent b should give this offer to agent a. Otherwise agent b should firstly satisfy its own requirement and give its new offer to agent a.
When agent a receives an offer from agent b, it should compute its own utility using algorithm 1. If agent a's utility requirement can be satisfied by this offer, then agent a should send agent b the new offer. Because the new offer would satisfy agent b's requirement, agent b should accept this new offer and negotiation succeeds. If agent a's utility requirement can not be satisfied by this offer, then agent a would not consider the requirement of agent b and only satisfies its own utility requirement, then it provides agent b the new offer based on its own preferences and utility function.
When agent b receives an offer from agent a, it should compute its own utility. If agent b's utility requirement can be satisfied by the counter-offer, agent b will accept the counter-offer. Negotiation succeeds. If it is not, then return to the beginning step of "Otherwise".
We give the following flow to understand the above operations.
Second phase:
Step 1: Set the result of the first phase as the initial allocation of resources. Choose one of the two agents and mark it as a, the other agent is marked as b.
Step 2: If agent b's utility requirement can be satisfied in the first phase, then agent b gives the allocation of the first phase to agent a.
Step 3: Else agent b provides the offer based on its own preferences and utility function, where its utility requirement can be satisfied. end if
Step 4: agent a receives the offer from agent b, then to compute its utility using algorithm 1.
Step 5: If agent a's utility requirement can be satisfied by this offer of algorithm 1, then agent a gives the optimal counter-offer to agent b. Agent b should accept the counter-offer because its own utility requirement can be satisfied. Negotiation succeeds.
Step 6: Else agent a provides the offer based on its own preferences and utility function, where its utility requirement can be satisfied.
Step 7: If agent b's utility requirement can be satisfied by the counter-offer, agent b will accept the counter-offer. Negotiation succeeds.
Step 8: Else go to step 3.
Experimental Evaluation

Optimal Performance of Algorithm 1
Recall example 4, agent a and b negotiate on 4 resources using this model. After the first phase, agent a obtained the following optimal results by algorithm 1. Table 7 .
Alternatively, if agent b firstly chooses resources. We improve the utilities of agent a by 53.8% (0.73155:0.47557) and that of agent b by 0.9% (0.60193:0.59664). Experimental results are shown in Table 8 .
Influence of λ a and λ b
If we change the value of λ a and λ b from 0.2 to 20, we get the results illustrated in Fig. 5 , where U We can find that when the value of λ a = λ b is small, the effect of optimization is mainly on agent a. If λ a = λ b < 4, few effect is added on agent b. If λ a = λ b > 5, the utilities of agent a are nearly saturated. At the same time, the utility of agent b is optimized greatly. So the effect of optimization is perfect. However, if λ a = λ b > 10, the utilities of agent a and b are both nearly saturated. So the effect of optimization is not well. We can find that the optimal utilities of agent b becomes bigger, that of agent a becomes smaller, and the social welfare of optimal utility of agent a and b becomes also bigger.
Influence of Various Kinds of Agents
If various kinds of agents participate the negotiation, we can get the average optimized efficiency in a small range. We take 18 various kinds of agents and these results are illustrated in Fig. 7 , where U We can find that the average utilities of agent a is improved by 59.56%. The average utilities of agent b is improved by 0.85%. The average utilities of agent a and b is improved by 28.95%.
The utilities of agent a and b is usually bigger than 1 because the parameter λ is enough big and the firing rate is enough high and it realizes the result of win-win.
Comparison With Linear Utility Functions
If we compare the optimized results of nonlinear utility functions with those of linear utility functions, we can find that the former is higher than the latter. The reason may be that the former considers not only the preferences of agents, but also the quantity of resources. Thus the former is more possible to get Table 8 and 9 show the comparison of optimized efficiency among the work of Fatima, Faratin and ours. We can discover the above conclusion from these tables. More results of comparison are illustrated in section 6.6. 
Comparison With the Work of Fatima
We compare experimental results of algorithm of Fatima et al and that of algorithm 1. The result is illustrated in Fig. 8 , where U There are 18 cases if agent a and b are different kinds and alternatively firstly choose resources in the first phase. The average initial utilities of agent a in all 18 cases using algorithm 1 is 0.529661 and that of optimized utilities is 0.822555, therefore algorithm 1 improves utilities of agent a by 59.56%. While using methods of Fatima et al, these data are 0.580556, 0.583611, 0.55% respectively. Experimental results show algorithm 1 takes an advantage over the work of Fatima et al.
Background and Related Work
In recent years, researches on agent multi-issue negotiation with incomplete information attract more and more attention. Generally speaking, there are simultaneous procedure, sequential procedure, and package deal procedure approaches. However, only package deal procedure can ensure Pareto optimal solution indicated by Fatima et al [5] . Therefore, we only introduce the approach of package deal procedure to ensure Pareto optimal results in this paper. Negotiation on multiple resources is always a challenging task. Dunne et al [15] study automatic contract negotiation in e-commerce and e-trading environments, they consider the computational complexity of a number of natural decision problems of one-resource-at-a-time to construct a mutually beneficial optimal reallocation by trading resources. An et al [13] present a proportional resource allocation mechanism and give a game theoretical analysis of the optimal strategies with incomplete information. Saha et al [2] present a protocol for negotiation on multiple indivisible resources which can be used by rational agents to reach efficient outcomes through searching negotiation tree. Chevaleyre et al [3] try to balance efficiency and fairness requirements to set up a distributed negotiation framework which will allow a group of agents to reach an allocation of goods that is both efficient and envy-free. Lin et al [18] conduct experiments on the allocation of circumstance of work and the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. However, all of these existed researches have not given clear utility function, instead, utility value is given in advance or resources are directly taken as utilities. Unfortunately, there are many cases where the utility function is nonlinear. As well as Wooldridge [9] points out utility is not money but it is a useful analogy and he gives a typical relationship between utility and money like saturated nonlinear function.
A number of researches are dedicated to coping with incomplete information by learning preferences of opponents. Luo et al [1, 19] learns preferences of opponents based on knowledge models and through "default then adjust" approach. Lin et al [18] determine kinds of agents through offers in the process of negotiation based on the approach of naive Bayes class. The principle of our work is similar with the approach of Lin et al that we determine types of opponents by reasoning from the information obtained in the first phase.
A Pareto optimal result is another important aim in multi-issue negotiation and some effective researches are done recently. Faratin et al [16] propose to maximize the utilities of opponents based on the same utilities of oneself to improve acceptive possibility of opponents. While Fatima et al [5] propose a similar approach to maximize the utilities of oneself based on the same utilities of opponent. The approach of our work is similar with that of Fatima et al but different from the definition and the treatment of utility functions.
Nonlinear utility functions were focused in the past years. Fatima et al [22] analyze bilateral multi-issue negotiation involving nonlinear utility functions.They show that it is possible to reach Pareto-optimal agreements by negotiating all the issues together, and that finding an equilibrium is not computationally easy if the agents' utility functions are nonlinear. They investigate two solutions: approximating nonlinear utility spaces with linear functions, and using a simultaneous procedure where the issues are discussed in parallel but independently of each other. They show that the equilibrium solution can be computed in polynomial time. However, their work is focused on symmetric negotiations where the agent's preferences are identically distributed, and the utility functions are separable in nonlinear polynomials of a single variable.
Vazirani et al [11] investigated some issues of computational complexity on market equilibrium under separable, piecewise-linear, concave utilities. They consider Fisher and Arrow-Debreu markets under additively separable, piecewiselinear, concave utility functions and obtain the following results. For both market models, if an equilibrium exists, there is one that is rational and can be written using polynomially many bits. There is no simple necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium. Under standard (mild) sufficient conditions, the problem of finding an exact equilibrium is in PPAD for both market models. Finally, they prove that under these sufficient conditions, finding an equilibrium for Fisher markets is PPAD-hard.
Complex nonmonotonic preference spaces were investigated by various researchers such as Ito et al. [21] , Marsa-Maestre et al. [23, 24] , Lopez-Carmona et al. [12] , where Lopez-Carmona et al. proposed a region-based automated multi-issue negotiation protocol (RBNP), which is built upon a recursive nonmediated bargaining mechanism. The non-monotonic negotiation scenarios are created using an aggregation of Bell functions. In contrast to prior researches, which usually assume that agents have relatively simple preferences on the issues (e.g., can be characterized by strictly concave utility functions), they make a more general assumption that the preference of each agent can be non-monotonic and non-differentiable.
Conclusions
This paper proposed an improved nonlinear utility function motivated by firing function of artificial neuron of artificial neural network. The proposed utility func-tion follows the law of diminishing marginal utility. The negotiation model presented in this paper can deal with the instances of incomplete information, and Pareto optimal solutions will be obtained as a result. Experimental results show that the efficiency of optimal approach has an advantage over prior work.
The future work may improve the first phase of negotiation to reach a more rational preliminary agreement. A new optimal approach is also required to maximize the utilities of two agents, as well as maximizing the utilities of agent a.
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